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In the past decade, Timothy O 'Connor has established himself 
as one of the leading defenders of the agent-causal theory of free 
action. In Persons & Causes, O 'Connor provides a sophisticated 
defense of incompatibilist freedom and his own agent-causal and 
volitional theory of the etiology of action. He includes an account 
of a non-causal theory of the role of reasons in the explanation of 
action and a defense of emergentism as a means of making sense 
of how agents can possess the requisite active powers for them to 
act freely. Additionally, O 'Connor critiques the most prominent 
alternatives to the agency theory at providing a libertarian theory 
of free action, as well as other varieties of the agency theory. Al-
together, he provides a solid assessment and critique of the major 
alternatives to the agency theory, coupled with what is perhaps the 
best recent defense of a traditional agent-causal theory of free ac-
tion. 
O 'Connor begins chapter one of his book by considering the 
implications of determinism for human freedom by evaluating some 
modal pr inc ip les that have undergi rded recent a r g u m e n t s for 
incompatibil ism. The modal notions in question are encapsulated 
in what Peter van Inwagen dubbed the consequence argument. The 
argument involves an analysis of the transfer of power necessity 
that results from past events and the laws of nature if determinism 
is true. The transfer of necessity that obtains is such that if at some 
time t2 agent 5 wills to V, and if S's willing to V is causally neces-
sitated by the laws of nature and some earlier event at tf beyond 
S's control at tt, then S's choice and subsequent action V were not 
up to S. Therefore, S 's action was not free. 
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to arguing for the co-
gency of the argument for incompatibilism, as well as a brief con-
sideration of the kinds of responses offered by compatibi l is ts to 
such arguments . Finally, he concludes by offering a brief analysis 
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of the problem of moral responsibility (taken up again in chapter 
four). He considers Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Prin-
ciple of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)—defending the "flicker of 
freedom" defense of some form of P A P and crit iquing John Mar-
tin Fischer ' s semi-compatibilism (the view that free will and de-
t e r m i n i s m a re i n c o m p a t i b l e , but m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
determinism are compatible). 
Having argued for the incompatibility of freedom with deter-
minism, O 'Connor puts forth two basic conditions for responsible 
agency in chapter two. The first requirement is that one must pro-
vide a clear account of agent control. Libertarians have often been 
criticized for defending a theory of erratic agency; thus, their bur-
den has traditionally been to provide an adequate account of ratio-
nal a g e n c y and agen t con t ro l , an o n u s c o m p a t i b i l i s t s h a v e 
traditionally not had to shoulder. Second, "an account of human 
free agency . . . must allow for there being alternative courses of 
action that are genuinely open to the agent" (p. 24) . For the liber-
tarian this has not been a problem; however, the compatibil ist has 
faced difficulties trying to provide an adequate account of what it 
means for someone to have genuine alternatives. 
O 'Connor first examines the efforts of simple indeterminists 
(specifically, Carl Ginet) and causal indeterminists (Storrs McCal l , 
Robert Nozick, and Robert Kane) at providing a compell ing theory 
of libertarian free agency. He concludes that both the s imple inde-
terminist and causal indeterminist fail to provide satisfactory ac-
counts of agent control. The simple indeterminist 's analysis of agent 
control, "implicitly requires that the core mental events are en-
tirely uncaused" (p. 27). O 'Connor adds that, "if fundamental 
p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s a r e c a u s a l l y c o n n e c t e d ( p e r h a p s 
indeterministically), supposing there are free decisions in accor-
dance with this analysis is inconsistent with a materialist and even 
an emergent dualist account of human mental act ivi ty" (p . 27) . 
On the other hand, probabilistic causal analyses of agent control , 
despite some distinctions between the theories, suffer from simi-
lar problems over explaining agent control, according to O 'Connor . 
"ITJhe causal indeterminist needs to confront directly the chal-
lenge of explaining how it is that an agent can have a choice about 
which potential indeterministic cause will be efficacious in a given 
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si tuation" (pp. 29-30). O 'Connor argues that none of the extant 
theories offered to date have effectively accomplished this task. 
In chapters three and four, O 'Connor considers the agency 
theory as a means of providing a more effective defense of a liber-
tarian theory of free action. In chapter three he focuses on the 
defenses of the agency theory proffered by Thomas Reid, Roderick 
Chisholm, and Richard Taylor. O 'Connor ' s treatment of Chisholm, 
in particular, is outstanding and reflects a deep familiarity with 
Chisho lm ' s work. Great care is taken in an appendix to chapter 
three trying to understand the development of Ch i sho lm ' s thought 
from the agency theory into a disingenuous variety of s imple inde-
terminism and, finally, to an outright rejection of the agency theory 
in favor of regarding agent-causation as a subspecies of event-
causation. 
O 'Connor notes that Richard Taylor is one of a few action 
theorists who has provided an account of the agency theory not as 
a means of defending a libertarian theory of free action, but to 
understand action simpliciter. Taylor suggested the concept of 
agency is compatible with determinism and does not require any 
particular commitments to an account of free action. 
O 'Connor argues that Taylor ' s account suffers from two ma-
jor problems. First, O 'Connor contends that one ' s being the agent-
cause of all of one ' s actions "undercuts the utility of the agency 
theory as a solution to the metaphysical problem of human re-
sponsibility and freedom" (p. 51) . Some of our actions are not 
free, and O ' C o n n o r maintains that those actions are not agent-
caused. But the problem with O ' C o n n o r ' s criticism is that he fails 
to see how much more consistent Taylor was in his days of de-
fending the agency theory (he has since rejected agent-causation) 
than those like O 'Connor who defend the agency theory while main-
taining that at least some actions are not agent-caused and are de -
termined by event-causes. O 'Connor never provides a satisfactory 
account of what mechanism would be responsible for when an ac-
tion is caused by an agent and when an action is not agent-caused. 
In chapter six, under the heading of his discussion of emergent 
a c t i v e p o w e r s , O ' C o n n o r even a d m i t s tha t , " [ a n ] i s sue an 
emergentist version of the agency theory faces is a result of the 
fact that if there are agent-causal events, there is no neat and simple 
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way of dividing them from event-causal ones" (p. 122). O ' C o n n o r 
fails to provide a satisfactory account of how event- and agent-
causal processes interact (see p . 123). Taylor at least takes all 
actions to be agent-caused. His theory is simpler and perhaps pref-
erable on that level. But Taylor ' s theory suffers from deficien-
cies, evinced by O ' C o n n o r ' s second criticism. 
O ' C o n n o r ' s second criticism generates genuine problems for 
Taylor. For Taylor, agent-causation is conceptually primitive, but 
its ontological status is questionable. As a result confusion arises 
in his theory when explaining how agent-caused actions can be 
caused, and thus determined, by an event . M o r e specifically, 
O 'Connor asks, "Just how are we to understand the notion of an 
exercise of active power itself produced by some prior factor?" (p. 
52). If the agent-causing of an action is ontologically primit ive, 
then it would seem it would make no sense to describe an agent 
causing her action as following from an event that is sufficient for 
her to cause her action. As O 'Connor notes, "If A ' s doing e al-
ways consists of A ' s causing e, then A ' s doing e does entail that A 
is not caused to do e" (p. 55) . (One would want to add that " A ' s 
causing en would have to be irreducible to an event-causal relation 
of the sort posited by the causal indeterminist. For the causal in-
determinist may be willing to agree that agent-causation is con-
ceptual ly pr imi t ive where the agent-causal relat ion is s imply 
reducible to an event-causal relation.) 
In chapter four O 'Connor develops his own views, contrast ing 
them with the hybrid causal agent-causal theory of action (an agent-
causal theory of action that incorporates a causal indeterminist 
theory of acting for reasons) defended by Randolph Clarke. Addi-
tionally, he addresses the standard challenge to the coherence of 
the agency theory, specifically the intelligibility of causation by a 
substance, as offered by C D . Broad and built upon by others since. 
He also critiques Raziel Abelson ' s ersatz agent-causalism and re-
examines P A P and how the agency theory can be used to defuse 
Frankfurt-style cases. 
O 'Connor takes agent-causation to embody " the same primi-
tive feature of causal production, or oomph, at work in event cau-
sation, the differences consisting in the way that certain propert ies 
contribute to the causal potentialities of objects that have 'ac t ive 
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p o w e r ' " (p. 67) . More specifically, he defends a realist theory of 
event-causat ion where objects manifest causal powers that are 
observable in their effects. The relevant causal powers are based 
in an object ' s underlying nature. The powers are features of clus-
ters of properties linked with functions to effects from circum-
stances (p. 71) . O 'Connor writes, following R. Harre and E.H. 
Madden , that, "Circumstances prompt the exercise of a power in 
one of two ways: either by stimulating a latent mechanism to ac-
tion or by removing inhibitors to the activity of a mechanism in a 
state of readiness to act" (p. 71). O 'Connor uses the example of 
turning a ca r ' s ignition key as an example of a mechanism-tr igger-
ing event; and the displacement of air from an underwater cylin-
der, "which enables the body of water to crush the object ," as an 
example of a barrier-removing event (p. 71) . 
In the case of agent-causation, the agent causes a state of in-
tention that gives rise to further actions. He proffers the following 
account. 
[P]arallel to event causes , the distinctive capacit ies of agent 
causes ( 'act ive powers ' ) are grounded in a property or set of prop-
erties. So any agent having the relevant internal properties will 
have it directly within his power to cause any of a range of states 
of intention del imited by internal and external c i rcumstances . 
However , these properties function differently in the associated 
causal process . Instead of being associated with ' functions from 
circumstances to effects, ' they (in conjunction with appropriate 
c i rcumstances) make possible the agen t ' s producing an effect. 
These choice-enabling properties ground a different type of causal 
power of capac i ty—one that in suitable c i rcumstances is freely 
exercised by the agent himself (p. 72). 
O ' C o n n o r anticipates objections to such an account , in par-
ticular his simultaneously holding to a causal powers theory of 
event causation, which is an antisingularist variety of causal real-
ism, while defending an account of agent-causation that implies 
singularism. Singularists hold that causation is not general , in the 
sense that the presence of certain event-types does not entail that 
they will a lways cause a certain type of event. Unfortunately, 
O ' C o n n o r seems to wave off any problems this discrepancy illu-
mines in his account, suggesting that the problem is not with his 
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accoun t but wi th the cur ren t concep t ion of the s i n g u l a r i s t / 
antisingularist distinction (pp. 72-73). 
Is such an account of agent-causation satisfactory? That is, 
has O 'Connor genuinely illuminated and rendered intelligible the 
nature of the causal relationship the agency theorist c la ims obtains 
between an agent and her acting? For O 'Connor , the event that is a 
basic action is initiated by the agent qua cause. T o suggest other-
wise would be to say that the causing of the basic action by the 
agent is an event discrete from the basic action. If such an event is 
introduced as the cause of the action, the agent and the event that 
follows the agent ' s causal activity would instance an event-causal 
relation—i.e. , the agent-causal relation would then be reducible to 
an event-causal relation. But O 'Connor insists that no such ante-
cedent relation precedes the action, thus we are stuck with trying 
to understand a causal relation that resists any systematic explana-
tion in intelligible terms. If we say that the agent brings about or 
causes the action, then, if we explicate what is meant by " the agent 
caused an event" in terms devoid of reference to causation by an 
event, we are left with a conceptually arcane account of what the 
relevant relation amounts to. O 'Connor nowhere seems to ad-
equately address this problem. The upshot is that he leaves the 
causal relation as sui generis, being inexplicable and unintelligible. 
In this respect, he does not advance beyond previous at tempts at 
making sense of the agent-causal relation; his work on providing 
an account of event-causation as a model for agent-causal rela-
tions notwithstanding. 
In chapter five, O 'Connor argues for a non-causal theory of 
acting for reasons. Additionally, O 'Connor considers the range of 
actions an agent undertakes that we can say are free. His account 
of reasons-explanations relies heavily on the work of Carl Ginet . 
The role of reasons in explaining actions is best regarded as teleo-
logical on O ' C o n n o r ' s account. Acting to satisfy an antecedent 
desire D is to act in a manner an agent believed would be condu-
cive to fulfilling her desire, the action being initiated by the self-
determining causal activity of the agent. The conative state of 
desiring that D is concurrent with the action, but plays no causal 
role, the action being the intended means of satisfying D. The 
intention is itself a causal consequence of the agent ' s causal activ-
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ity. Moreover the intention is then the action-triggering event that 
"causally sustained the completion of the act ion" (p. 86) . Note , 
however , that the explanation of the action in terms of a reason 
does not have recourse to the reason qua mental state that causes 
the action. Rather, it is the content of the state that seems relevant 
in O ' C o n n o r ' s account (a fact he does not make explici t) . The 
reasons direct action, but they do not cause the action. Similar 
accounts of acting for reasons are defended by simple indetermin-
ists like Hugh McCann and, as mentioned, Carl Ginet . 
While such an account of reasons-explanations may be a prom-
ising route to go for the agency theorist, it seems the agency theo-
rist, such as O 'Connor , must explain why the reason-state does not 
have a causal function in the production of action. This problem 
seems especial ly acute for O ' C o n n o r given that, as ment ioned 
above, he believes there are instances when an agen t ' s act ions are 
not caused by the agent herself, but are the consequence of event-
causal processes. Suffice it to say that the problems he faces with 
the theory of the role of reasons in explaining act ions are out-
weighed only by the aforementioned problems with intelligibly 
explaining the nature of the putative causal relation that obtains 
between an agent and her actions. 
Finally, in chapter six, O 'Connor develops an emergentis t ac-
count of the active powers he suggests are involved in the causa-
tion of ac t ions by agen t s . He wri tes that , " In ca l l ing s o m e 
phenomenon 'emergent , ' we intend to express the idea that it in-
troduces a qualitatively new, macro-level feature into the wor ld" 
(p. 111). The emergent properties relevant for O ' C o n n o r ' s theory 
of action would be agent-causal properties. Such a property is "a 
nonstructural , natural property that is exemplified by objects or 
systems that attain the appropriate level and kind of organizational 
complexity and that exerts downward causat ion" (p. 111). In this 
case, the relevant object or system would be the agent who can 
exercise causation as a result of the supervenient property on the 
subvening base propert ies . Needless to say, such a m o v e by 
O 'Connor is creative and compell ing and may lend more plausi-
bility to the agent-causal theory of action. But this requires mak-
ing a strong enough case for emergent ism, a task O ' C o n n o r takes 
up, providing a preliminary emergentist account of consciousness 
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and of the active power he claims would be the relevant causal 
property that would make causation by a substance intelligible. 
Notice, however, that O 'Connor ' s task is a daunting one. Not only 
must he provide an adequate defense of emergent i sm—a task I 
believe he has taken significant steps to fulfill, but he must still 
convince his detractor that his theory of causation is viable. Fur-
thermore, he must show that agent- and event-causation are not so 
different as to render his theory of causation irrelevant for the task 
of making sense out of the idea of nonoccurrent causation. Whi le 
O 'Connor has taken steps towards fulfilling these tasks in Persons 
and Causes, more work needs to be done. 
Any criticisms aside, O 'Connor ' s work is by far the best book-
length defense of the agency theory to be published to date . He 
addresses the objections to the agency theory without compromis -
ing the central features of such a theory of action. Fur thermore , he 
provides incisive analysis of the competing incompatibilist theo-
ries of free action, as well as providing a strong argument for 
incompatibilism more broadly. He examines the logical and meta-
physical dimensions of the free will debate with clarity, depth, and 
a healthy dose of humility. In light of these features and others , 
O ' C o n n o r ' s book should be welcomed and read by those doing 
work in the philosophy of action, and it should prove to be of in-
terest to those doing work in related areas in the philosophy of 
mind, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. 
